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Environmental regulation of agriculture is becoming increasingly important, and growers
are concerned about the effects of these regulations on farm profitability.  Regulations
governing the use of a pesticide affect its economic viability.  Furthermore, growers often
face a choice among pesticide alternatives, each with its own set of regulatory
restrictions.  In this environment, the introduction of a new regulation can have complex
effects on growers’ profit-maximizing pesticide choices.  Buffer zones and regional
pesticide usage caps mean that pesticide choices often have important spatial
components.  Our paper presents an optimization model of pesticide use under regulation
that incorporates spatial considerations at the field and regional level.
We apply our model to a specific pesticide choice: fumigant choice by California
strawberry growers.  The industry is facing an impending ban on the use of methyl
bromide (MBr), which in conjunction with chloropicrin has been the standard fumigant
for over forty years.  This new use restrictions that apply to strawberry growers provides
us with an interesting environment for modeling the effects of pesticide regulations.
There are currently two legally available fumigants that may substitute for MBr in
strawberries:  1,3-dichloropropene (1,3-D) and chloropicrin.  1, 3-D is subject to
township caps and buffer zones.  Township caps limit total application in a thirty-six
square mile area.  Buffer zones prohibit applications within a specified number of feet of
certain adjacent land uses.  We evaluate the effects of these regulations on field-level
decisions and overall industry costs and returns.  The California Department of Pesticide
Regulation is currently undertaking air monitoring and other activities to determine
whether or not additional use restrictions should be applied to chloropicrin.2
We examine the role of pesticide use regulations in determining growers’ profit-
maximizing pesticide choices at the field level by combining three datasets with a field-
level spatial model of the profit-maximizing fumigation decision.  The first dataset
includes detailed field-level information regarding the costs and yields associated with
alternative fumigants obtained from a multi-disciplinary research project.  The second
includes chemical-specific California use regulations regarding treatment rates, buffer
zones, and other factors.  The third includes information on the shapes and sizes of
strawberry fields in California.   Using these data, the optimization model computes the
profit-maximizing treatment for each field.  Field-level results are aggregated to evaluate
the impact of regional pesticide regulations, and then to estimate the industry-level
effects of current and proposed pesticide use regulations.
Existing restrictions on fumigant use are integrated into a field-level programming
model of a grower’s fumigant decision choice.  The program calculates the optimal
fumigation plan for a field, given the field’s size and shape, and use regulations, and per-
acre costs and returns associated with each fumigant. The resulting field-level choices are
aggregated in order to check for compliance with township caps.  If caps are exceeded,
the model is rerun.  All choices for all fields are aggregated in order to obtain industry-
level results.  We perform this procedure for several possible fumigant application
scenarios under the current set of restrictions, assessing the profitability of each
alternative scenario.  We then remove the existing township caps on 1,3-D and calculate
the change in results.  We evaluate whether growers’ fumigant choices are sensitive to
the size of the 1,3-D buffer zone.3
Previous literature
Carter, Chalfant, and Goodhue (2002) examined the effect of MBr buffer zone
requirements on fumigated acreage and returns for the California strawberry industry. In
this paper we build on that work and examine multiple regulatory scenarios, explicitly
incorporating the costs and returns associated with alternative treatments, and we account
for regional use restrictions.
After MBr is banned, the demand for 1,3-D for strawberry fumigation will rise.
Carpenter, Lynch and Trout (2001) estimated this potential change in demand for 1,3-D ,
and the quantity of 1,3-D that could be actually applied given California’s township caps.
They found that growers would be unable to use as much 1,3-D as  they would like in 47
townships Given their limiting data set, Carpenter, Lynch and Trout were unable to
include the effect of buffer-zone regulations.  They simply assumed that 1,3-D would be
the most profitable alternative to MBr.  Lynch and Carpenter (2002) evaluated the
incidence of different rules for allocating 1,3-D quota when the township quota is
binding.  They found that demand will exceed the quota in 55 townships, and that acreage
to which growers would prefer to apply 1,3-D will exceed acreage allowed under the
quota by a third.  This previous research did not consider the effect of the quota banking
system introduced by DPR, which allows quota that was unused in previous years to be
added to current year quota, up to twice the current quota limit.  However, the banking
system by definition is not a long-term option, because a limited amount of unused quota
exists.4
Analytical Approach
Field-Level Optimal Fumigation Programming Model
We developed a computer program that determines the fumigation plan that maximizes
acres fumigated, given the regulatory constraints.  The nature of the fumigation problem
does not lend itself to standard optimization.  Instead, the code calculates the number of
days required to fumigate the entire field according to the following procedure: it begins
fumigating the maximum distance away from any mandatory in-field inner buffers,
referred to as ‘binding’ sides.   If only one side is binding, then the program does
fumigation strips back and forth, beginning on the other side of the field.  If two adjacent
sides are binding, it does L-shaped strips beginning along the other two sides of the field.
If two opposite sides are binding, it does fumigation strips beginning from the center.
With three binding sides, it begins in the center with an initial rectangle, then does U-
shaped applications that move toward the three binding sides.    If all four sides are
binding, it completes rectangles, starting from the center of the field. If no sides are
binding, it also completes rectangles, starting from the center of the field.
The fumigation optimization program cannot address all possible field shapes in
its current form.  It can analyze rectangles, right-angle triangles, and quadrilaterals with
two right angles (as illustrated in Figure 1).  It can also evaluate these shapes when a side
is missing acreage on its interior, provided the missing acreage does not intersect one of
the field's primary diagonals.  However, it cannot evaluate one of these shapes when a
corner of the field is missing (a “Utah”-shaped field). The other limitations of the
program are that it considers a buffer to be binding for the entire length of a side,
considers only one binding buffer width, regardless of the number of buffered sides, and5
considers only one application bloc per day, regardless of field size.  Conceptually, it is
possible to relax all of these restrictions; however, it is computationally expensive.
Relaxing these restrictions would require extensive programming efforts.  The appendix
reports the percentage of permit fields and acres analyzed by county.
Field Size and Shape Data
California pesticide use regulations are enforced through a permit system.  In order to
apply  a  restricted-use  pesticide,  a  grower  must  obtain  a  permit  from  the  county
agricultural commissioner.  The California Department of Pesticide Regulations (DPR)
issues “suggested permit conditions” that are its best scientific estimate of the minimum
requirements for protecting human health and the environment.  Each county agricultural
commissioner may adjust these suggested conditions to reflect local conditions.
Our data are based on a specific permit requirement.  In 2001, DPR enacted a new
set of use regulations for MBr.  Enforcement of these regulations required growers to
submit a worksite plan that eventually became part of the fumigation permit.   The
worksite plan included a map of the field and neighboring properties. We collected copies
of all completed 2001 fumigation permits and MBr worksite plans for strawberry fields in
the five largest strawberry-producing counties measured by product value: Monterey,
Orange, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, and Ventura. As a group, these five counties account
for 92 percent of the value of strawberries produced in California in 2000 (CDFA
Resource Directory, 2001). In total we collected roughly 200 worksite plans and permits.
For each field, we tabulated permit and field numbers, and field acreage. Each
field was categorized by shape. Field dimension information was included for fields that
could be analyzed using the optimal fumigation program. Table 1 summarizes the6
collected permit information by county.  The appendix documents our data collection
procedures and compares our permit dataset to other available information on strawberry
acreage and MBr application on strawberries.
The California Department of Pesticide Regulation compiles a comprehensive
dataset on annual pesticide applications in California, the Pesticide Use Reports (PUR)
database.  In Appendix 1, we compare its data on actual MBr use in strawberries to our
permit data.  The PUR database cannot be used for buffer zone analysis because it reports
only field acreage, and not field dimensions or shape.
Cost of Production Data
We obtained data on per-acre production costs and yields from a study of MBr
alternatives conducted at two locations in California in 2003: Oxnard (Ventura County)
and Watsonville (Monterey County) (Ajwa et al.; Goodhue, Fennimore, and Ajwa).  We
selected the most profitable Inline treatment and the most profitable chloropicrin
treatment under standard plastic for each location.  For Oxnard, application rates of 300
pounds per acre were the most profitable for 1,3-D and chloropicrin.  For Watsonville,
application rates of 400 pounds per acre were the most profitable for 1,3-D and
chloropicrin.  1,3-D had a lower cost and resulted in a higher strawberry yield than
chloropicrin at both sites.
For Orange County, we applied the production cost and yield information from
Oxnard.  For Santa Cruz County, we applied the production cost and yield information
from Watsonville.  Santa Barbara County was more problematic.  We applied the
production cost information from Oxnard, and adjusted the experimental yields to reflect
the percentage difference in 2003 average regional yields.7
In addition to these data, we use fresh strawberry demand elasticities reported in
Carter et al. to evaluate the effect of production changes on industry revenues (Table 2).
Consistent with Han’s analysis, we assume that the demand for processed strawberries is
perfectly elastic, due to the large number of available substitutes.
Pesticide Use Restrictions Scenarios
In an effort to protect public health, the California Department of Pesticide Regulation
(DPR) has implemented pesticide use regulations to minimize long-term inhalation
exposure to 1,3-D.  DPR has established permit conditions, which include buffer zones,
restricted application methods, and maximum application rates.  We focus on the
economic effects of the buffer zone regulation.  DPR requires all buffered fields to have a
minimum 100 feet buffer measured from the perimeter of the application block to any
occupied residences, occupied onsite employee housing, schools, convalescent homes,
hospitals, or other similar sites identified by the county agricultural commissioner.  If the
100 foot permit condition buffer zone has been used for one year, a 300 foot buffer zone




We simulated 1,3-D buffer zone permit requirements for fields in Monterey, Orange,
Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, and Ventura counties.  For each field, a buffer of 100 and 300
were analyzed.  The buffer was only binding for those fields which include a buffered
side.  Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results of the 100 and 300 foot buffer zone
simulations.  Our results suggest that Santa Barbara County is most affected by the 1,3-D8
use regulations.  When a grower is required to switch to the 300 foot buffer, the
regulation becomes more binding, increasing the share of the field that can no longer be
fumigated.
Optimal Fumigant Analysis
We analyze growers’ optimal fumigation choices under four fumigation scenarios.  In
two scenarios, 1,3-D is subject to a 100 foot buffer from sensitive sites.  In one of these
scenarios growers apply chloropicrin in the buffer zone.  In the second they do not
fumigate the buffer zone, although they do grow strawberries in that part of the field.  In
the other two scenarios, 1,3-D is subject to a 300 foot buffer from sensitive sites.  Again,
in one case chloropicrin is used in the buffer zone while in the other no fumigant is used.
Tables 5 to 8 report acreage decisions and production for the four scenarios.  Tables 5
and 6 report acreage decisions when growers are assumed to fumigate 1,3-D buffer zones
with chloropicrin, and Tables 7 and 8 report acreage decisions when growers are assumed
to not fumigate 1,3-D buffer zones.
The first table reports acreage allocation decisions when the 1,3-D buffer zone is
100 feet, and the buffer zone is treated with chloropicrin.  Only Santa Barbara and
Ventura counties apply chloropicrin to a significant share of total acreage.  In all five
counties, the only acreage fumigated with chloropicrin is the buffer zone acreage, or
entire fields that cannot be fumigated due to the buffer zone requirement.  Due to the
lower per-acre costs and higher per-acre yields associated with 1,3-D in the field trial
results, given a 100 foot buffer, all growers prefer to apply 1,3-D.   Results are similar for
the case where the 1,3-D buffer zone is 300 feet.  Although acreage treated with
chloropicrin increases relative to the first scenario, the larger buffer zone does not change9
the profit-maximizing fumigant for individual fields that were still able to apply 1,3-D to
some acreage.  These simulations ignore any transactions costs associated with using two
different fumigation regimes, so they may overstate the relative profitability of
fumigating part of a field with 1,3-D and the rest with chloropicrin.  However, in practice
some growers already use 1,3-D as a drip product, and fumigate the buffer zones with
chloropicrin.
Tables 7 and 8 report acreage allocations for the two buffer widths when the
buffer zone is not fumigated, but is used for strawberry production.  Compare Table 5 to
Table 7. Because returns are lower for untreated acreage than for chloropicrin-treated
acreage, growers compare the reduction in returns by moving from 1,3-D to chloropicrin,
and the increase in returns  from moving from no fumigation to chloropicrin, when
deciding what fumigant to use on a given field.  In virtually all cases, growers choose to
apply chloropicrin rather than accept reduced returns on 1,3-D buffer acreage.  The same
pattern holds when comparing Table 6 to Table 8.  When the 1,3-D buffer is 300 feet,
growers apply chloropicrin to all buffered fields in the sample.
Overall, our results suggest that the cost of buffer zone requirements for a given
pesticide depends on the alternatives available for use in the buffer zone.  Because
chloropicrin is a reasonably good alternative to 1,3-D, when it is used in the buffer zone
growers’ returns are relatively unaffected.  If there are no good alternatives available, for
technical or regulatory reasons, then buffer zone requirements for a pesticide are more
likely to reduce growers’ returns, and to influence their pesticide choices.10
Township Cap Analysis
In addition to the buffer zone requirements, the use of 1,3-D is subject to a township cap,
which can constrain growers’ fumigation decisions. We evaluate the effect of the current
1,3-D township cap on growers’ independent optimal fumigation choices.  In order to do
so, we aggregate the results from our field-level analyses to reflect industry acreage.  We
calculate the percentage of our individual fields using each treatment, and multiply it by
the 2004 planted acreage (Table 9) to obtain industry-level acreage numbers.
We calculate a measure of the spatial distribution of 1,3-D use that allows us to
estimate the minimum effect of the current 1,3-D township cap on growers’ independent
optimal fumigation choices.  For each county, we obtain the number of townships which
reported applications of MBr, 1,3-D, and/or chloropicrin on strawberries in 2001,
aggregate by production region, and then scale by the ratio of 2004 to 2001 production.
This estimate is a lower bound for three reasons: it maximizes the dispersion of
strawberry production in 2001, maximizes the change in dispersion due to the increase in
acreage between 2001 and 2004, and ignores the possibility that other crops may utilize
part of the 1,3-D cap in a given township.  We then divide 1,3-D acreage evenly across
townships and calculate total 1,3-D use.
   We subtract the cap from the desired 1,3-D use per township to obtain the pounds
of 1,3-D exceeding quota when growers make their optimal field-level fumigation
decisions.  Dividing this number by the regional application rate provides the number of
acres per township that cannot apply 1,3-D even though it would be optimal to do so.  We
assume that this acreage is fumigated with chloropicrin instead.  For the scenarios where
no fumigant is applied in the 1,3-D buffer zone, we specify that the first fields to11
transition to chloropicrin instead of 1,3-D are those for which the 1,3-D buffers are
binding.
Results of our aggregated analysis are reported in Tables 10 through 13.  The first
table compares acreage allocation decisions with and without the township caps when the
1,3-D buffer zone is 100 feet, and the buffer zone is treated with chloropicrin.  Except for
Orange County (South District), the township cap alters regional acreage allocation
decisions.  In Watsonville, 1,3-D acreage declines from 96.1% to one-third of total
acreage.  In Ventura County, 1,3-D acreage falls from 94.7% to 52.5% of total strawberry
acreage.  While the decline in Santa Barbara is less dramatic, 1,3-D’s share of total
fumigated strawberry acreage is 5.5% smaller when the township cap is imposed.
Tables 12 and 13 examine the effect of the township caps when no fumigant is
used in the buffer zone.  Recall from the field-level analysis that fewer growers chose to
apply 1,3-D when no fumigant is used in the buffer zone than when chloropicrin is used
in the buffer zone.  Because of this change in field-level decisions, the effect of the
township cap is different for Santa Barbara than it was when chloropicrin was applied in
the 100-foot buffer zone.  Because of the difference in profitability, more acres in Santa
Barbara apply chloropicrin, and the township cap is no longer binding for the 100-foot
1,3-D buffer zone.   As was the case when chloropicrin was applied in the buffer zone, a
300-foot buffer induces enough acreage to be fumigated with chloropicrin that the
township cap is not binding.
In the two areas where the township cap had a very large effect on acreage
allocation, Ventura and Watsonville, the cap remains binding, although the share of12
acreage allocated to each treatment varies slightly.  In Orange County, the township cap
continues to be non-binding.
Our results demonstrate that the impact of an aggregate spatial use regulation,
such as the 1,3-D township cap, is dependent on the impact of other use regulations,
including spatial use regulations such as 1,3-D buffer zones.  For the case we analyze, the
300-foot buffer zone scenarios are most relevant, because of the restriction that 100-foot
buffers can be used only every third year.  In this case, the effect of the buffer zone
requirement was to eliminate any effect of the township cap on pesticide use decisions in
Orange and Santa Barbara counties.
Our results also demonstrate that the effect of multiple pesticide use regulations
will not be simply additive, because they interact with growers’ profit-maximizing
pesticide use decisions.  For example, increasing the buffer zone width had a different
effect on pesticide use decisions when township caps were present than when they were
not.  For Watsonville and Ventura, the caps were sufficiently binding that increasing the
buffer zone did not affect acreage allocation.
One factor that our analysis holds constant is the spatial distribution of growers.
If the presence of buffer zones around sensitive sites or the use of township caps causes
growers to alter their production sites, then the effects of spatial use regulations on
grower returns may be reduced.  Growers would continue to apply the pesticide; their
location simply would have changed.  We have chosen to specify a spatial distribution
that minimizes the effect of township caps on growers’ profit-maximizing decisions;
actual production patterns may have a larger effect.13
Market-level analysis
One of the notable characteristics of the California fresh strawberry industry is that
different production regions produce for the fresh market at different times of the year.
We evaluate the consequences of yield differences across alternatives in regions for the
price of fresh strawberries.  To do so, we employ the stage demand elasticities reported
by Carter et al., and compute total volume for each stage by adding the volume delivered
from each region.  This volume is calculated for each region by multiplying its total
production by the share of its fresh production delivered in that time period.  Like Carter
et al., we assume that the demand for processed strawberries is perfectly elastic, so that
there are no price effects on processed berries due to regulations.
Because chloropicrin is a reasonably good substitute for 1,3-D in terms of
maintaining yield, the market-level effects on output and prices are small, so revenues
remain virtually unchanged.  However, chloropicrin is more costly, so that industry costs
increase.  The increase in cost is less than $300 per acre, however, so the cost effects of
the regulations are also relatively small.  Under the most realistic scenario, where
chloropicrin is applied on 300-foot 1,3-D buffers and township caps are applied, revenues
decline by 1.15 percent or less, depending on the stage of the season.
Conclusions
Environmental regulation of agriculture is becoming increasingly important.  The
impending 2005 methyl bromide ban is a substantial concern for important segments of
California agriculture.  By explicitly analyzing the effect of regulations affecting methyl
bromide alternatives in a model that  includes both the spatial dimensions of regulations14
and the costs and yields associated with each alternative, we obtain a more detailed and
accurate assessment of the costs of these regulations than is currently available.  Our
results provide a greater understanding of the effects of these regulations on industry
profitability, and how these regulations interact.
At the industry level, the revenue and cost effects of the regulations will be
negligible, relative to the case where growers all apply 1,3-D.  Although in all cases the
effects are small, they are larger when the township cap is taken into account, and when
there is a 300-foot buffer instead of a 100-foot buffer.  Because our analysis focused only
on chloropicrin and 1,3-D, our results cannot be used to evaluate the effect of the MBr
ban on the industry.  Instead, we simply compare alternative post-ban scenarios under
existing regulations.
Our model could be applied to other cases of pesticide regulations. It has the
benefit of incorporating spatial considerations. It is important to aid policymakers in
understanding how environmental regulations interact with each other, possibly in
unexpected ways.15
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Appendix: Data Quality
For this analysis, we collected copies of workplans and, in some cases, permits from five
counties: Monterey, Orange, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, and Ventura.  Samples of each
county’s workplan and DPR’s suggested format are available at
http://www.agecon.ucdavis.edu/facultypages/chalfant/papers/CDFAJuly22-appendix.pdf.
Data Collection
Table A1 reports the total strawberry acreage collected using the permits and workplans
from the county agricultural commissioner offices.  The acreages are compared to district
production acres for the 2002 crop year, obtained from the California Strawberry
Commission (2004). (Fumigation occurs in the late summer or fall for production the
next year.)  The low total acreage, relative to total strawberry acreage, suggests that in
addition to the use of alternatives, some permits and methyl bromide workplans are not
included in our analysis.  There are two obvious reasons to expect the acreages to differ.
First, some acreage used alternatives to methyl bromide, so no methyl bromide workplan
was submitted. Second, we collected permits by county, rather than district, so that
acreage in adjoining counties would not be included.   The latter factor is likely most
important for the Santa Maria production region.  A significant share of this region is in
San Luis Obispo County, whereas we only evaluate Santa Barbara.  It seems unlikely,
however, that these factors account for all of the acreage difference.  We are uncertain of
the reasons underlying remaining acreage differences.
The next table compares the number of distinct entities applying for permits and
permit acreage to the number of unique grower identification numbers and methyl
bromide fumigation acreage reported in the California Department of Pesticide18
Regulation’s 2001 Pesticide Use Report database (PUR).  These differences are due to at
least two factors.  First, the permits were collected as copies of permits from the
individual County Agricultural Commissioners.  There was no guarantee that we obtained
one hundred percent of all applications.  This difference is reflected most clearly in the
number of growers obtaining permits, which is smaller than the number of grower
identification numbers associated with methyl bromide use.  Use acreage is higher than
permit acreage in Monterey, Ventura, and Santa Cruz counties.   Second, because the
permits are granted prior to the actual application and reflect grower intentions, it is
unlikely that there would be an exact correspondence between intended acreage and
actual acreage.  The noticeably smaller PUR acreage relative to permit acreage in Orange
and Santa Barbara counties is consistent with growers simply choosing to fumigate fewer
acres with methyl bromide than they had initially projected.
Optimal fumigation data analysis
We entered field dimensions when we could determine measurements with a reasonable
degree of confidence.   For example, if we had information regarding the length of a
rectangular field and its acreage, we could calculate the width.   When we could not
determine field dimensions, we did not include fields in the analysis.   No counties
explicitly required information regarding field dimensions in their workplans.
Table  A3  summarizes  the  fields  analyzed  in  the  simulation  program,  and
compares them to the total fields collected by collecting workplans and permits from the
county agricultural commissioner offices.  Monterey County had the lowest percentages.19









Permits 72 22 39 65 42 198
Number of fields 82 41 80 64 99 267
Total Acreage in
Permits 5,451 1,484 2,860 1,809 5,599 11,604
Source:  compiled  from  individual  permits  collected  from  County  Agricultural
Commissioners.
Table 2. Demand Elasticities and Stage Definitions for the Fresh Strawberry Market
Stage Own-Price Elasticity of Demand
Stage I (January to Easter) -1.4
Stage II (Easter to Mothers’ Day) -1.5
Stage III (Mothers’ Day to July Fourth) -2.7
Stage IV (July Fourth to Labor Day) -1.3
Stage V (after Labor Day) -1.3
Source: Carter et al. Table 4.

















Monterey 723 18 2.5 14.3 24.6
Orange 606 13 2.2 19.0 26.5
Santa
Barbara
517 81 15.7 66.7 38.5
Santa Cruz 580 33 5.7 38.9 18.2
Ventura 1720 91 5.3 25.7 21.8
Source:  Field  acreage  compiled  from  individual  permits  collected  from  County
Agricultural Commissioners.  Buffer acreage from analysis.20


















Monterey 723 45 6.3 14.3 52.2
Orange 606 34 5.6 19.0 61.6
Santa
Barbara
517 184 35.6 66.7 76.1
Santa Cruz 580 85 14.7 38.9 46.3
Ventura 1720 241 14.0 25.7 55.8
Source:  Field  acreage  compiled  from  individual  permits  collected  from  County
Agricultural Commissioners.  Buffer acreage from analysis.
Table 5. Simulation results: Acres per fumigation treatment. 100 ft. 1,3-D buffer,





Santa Barbara 436 81
Santa Cruz 547 33
Ventura 1630 91






Santa Barbara 333 184
Santa Cruz 495 85
Ventura 1,489 24121
Table 7. Acres per fumigation treatment. 100 ft. 1,3-D buffer, no fumigation in
buffer
Acres
County 1,3-D None PIC
Monterey 644 3 76
Orange 565 3 38
Santa Barbara 228 0 289
Santa Cruz 489 9 82
Ventura 1,308 4 408
Table 8. Acres per fumigation treatment. 300 ft. 1,3-D buffer, no fumigation in
buffer
Acres
County 1,3-D None PIC
Monterey 610 0 112
Orange 532 0 74
Santa Barbara 228 0 289
Santa Cruz 366 0 214
Ventura 1,229 0 492





Watsonville (Monterey and Santa Cruz) 12,201
Total 31,095
Source: California Strawberry Commission, 2004.
Table 10. Share Regional Acreage by treatment with and without township caps for




Region 1,3-D PIC 1,3-D PIC
Orange 97.8 2.2 97.8 2.2
Santa Barbara 84.3 15.7 78.7 21.3
Ventura 94.7 5.3 52.5 47.5
Watsonville 96.1 3.9 33.2 66.822
Table 11. Share Regional Acreage by treatment with and without township caps for




Region 1,3-D PIC 1,3-D PIC
Orange 94.4 5.6 94.4 5.6
Santa Barbara 64.4 35.6 64.4 35.6
Ventura 86.0 14.0 52.5 47.5
Watsonville 90.0 10.0 33.2 66.8
Table 12. Share Regional Acreage by treatment with and without township caps for







Region 1,3-D None PIC 1,3-D None PIC
Orange 93.3 0.5 6.3 93.3 0.5 6.3
Santa Barbara 44.1 0.0 55.9 44.1 0.0 55.9
Ventura 76.0 0.3 23.7 52.5 0.0 47.5
Watsonville 86.9 1.0 12.1 33.2 0.0 66.8
Table 13. Share Regional Acreage by treatment with and without township caps for







Region 1,3-D None PIC 1,3-D None PIC
Orange 87.8 0.0 12.2 87.8 0.0 12.2
Santa Barbara 44.1 0.0 55.9 44.1 0.0 55.9
Ventura 71.4 0.0 28.6 52.5 0.0 47.5
Watsonville 75.0 0.0 25.0 33.2 0.0 66.823
Table A1. Collected Permit Data by County
versus 2002
Production Acreage by District
Permits Acres Production Acres
Orange 1,484.3 Orange, 2,538
San Diego
Ventura 5,984.0 Oxnard 8,582
Santa Barbara 2,824.8 Santa Maria 4,100
Monterey, 7,199.9 Watsonville 11,300
Santa Cruz
Total 17,493.0 22,352.1
Source: Permit acreage compiled from individual permits collected from County
Agricultural Commissioners.  Production acreage from CSC (2004).










Permits 72 22 39 65 42 198
Number of PUR
Grower IDs 110 19 35 51 58
Total Acreage in
Permits 5,451 1,484 2,860 1,809 5,599 11,604
Total PUR
acreage 7,064 1,051 2,671 2,891 7,799
Source:  compiled  from  individual  permits  collected  from  County  Agricultural
Commissioners and from DPR Pesticide Use Report Database.
Table A3. Optimal Fumigation Program  Coverage Summary
% Total Total % Average Average
Permit Sim. Fields Permit Sim. Acres Permit Sim.
County Fields Fields Sim. Acres Acres Sim. Acres Acres
Monterey 134 25 18.7% 5,401.2 634.5 11.7% 40.6 25.4
Orange 44 22 50.0% 1,484.3 610.8 41.2% 33.7 27.8
Santa Barbara 80 23 28.8% 2,824.8 484.2 17.1% 35.3 21.1
Santa Cruz 59 14 23.7% 1,798.7 432.4 24.0% 28.1 30.9
Ventura 98 28 28.6% 5,984.0 1,371.2 22.9% 61.1 49.0
Total 415 102 17,493.0 3,533.124

























































1 Rectangular interior missing acreage modeled as half -circle of the same acreage.  
 